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Wolfgang Schneider 
For the past three decades, many cognitive researchers have busied them" 
selves studying cognitive strategies. The vast preponderance of this research 
was concerned with single processes (e. g., rehearsal, clustering, imagery) 
in limited learning domains (e. g., list learning, paired-associate acquisition, 
pro se recall). More recent investigations have zeroed in on other factors, 
such as metacognition and schematic knowledge. It was apparent by the 
mid-1970s that just being able to execute a variety of cognitive processes 
was not sufficient to be considered a good strategy user, and that strategie, 
metacognitive, and knowledge variables were related in complex ways (e. 
g., Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & Campione, 1983; Pressley, Heisel, 
McCormick, & Nakamura, 1982; Pressley, Forrest-PressIey, Elliott-Faust, 
& Miller, 1985). The Good Strategy User (GSU) model presented here 
was motivated to capture these skills and knowledge as they are coordinated 
by capable thinkers. 
There are five components of good strategy use: (1) A sophisticated 
thinker has many strategies that can be tapped, some general, some specific, 
but all useful for obtaining goals. (2) The GSU knows how, when, and 
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where to apply each of these various techniques. (3) The GSU possesses 
the general understanding that good performance is tied to effort, partic~ 
ularly effort expended in earrying out appropriate strategies. They also 
know that in general, strategie aetions are most likely to be successful if 
strategies are shielded from competing behaviors, distraetions and emo~ 
tions. (4) GSUs have non-strategie knowledge about the world (i. e., that 
indudes many domains from the alphabet to Gary Carter's batting aver-
age). When activated, domain-specifie knowledge often makes strategy use 
unnecessary, prompts the use of a strategy that the learner might not think 
 of otherwise, and improves the efficiency of strategy execution. (5) GSUs 
 have automatized the first four eomponents and their coordination. 
The importance of strategies, metacognitive knowledge about specific 
strategies, general strategie tendencies and general strategie knowledge, 
the thinker's nonstrategic knowledge base, and automaticity will become 
dearer as each component in the Good Strategy User is reviewed in detail. 
What we attempt here is to abstract a framework that is more than any of 
its components due to complex interactions between the individual pieces. 
These interactions are taken up at appropriate points in the discussion of 
each component. We first discuss the role of specific strategies from the 
perspeetive of the GSU model. 
SPECIFIC STRATEGIES 
There are three broad categories of specific strategies. There are a variety 
of goal-specijic strategies for different types of memory, comprehension, 
and problern-solving tasks. Monitoring strategies are responsible for reg-
ulation of goal-specific strategies. The individual procedures suitable for 
achieving performance goals are often eombined by higher~order sequenc-
ing strategies. 
Goal-Specific Strategies 
A GSU knows how to execute a variety of goal-specific strategies. AI-
though debate continues about the fundamental nature of such strategies, 
(Pressley, Forrest-Pressley, & Elliott-Faust, in press), there are certain 
features that are indisputable. The aim of a strategy user is always to 
accompli~h a purpose beyond simple execution of a strategy, such as un-
derstandtng a passage, learning materials for later recall communication, 
or finding the answer to a problem. Strategies are op~rations over and 
Q a~ove the ~rocesses that are a natural consequence of doing a task. Thus, 
slmply turmng a page or looking at text do not qualify as reading strategies. 
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The most controversial definitional issue concerns whether strategy ex-
ecution requires eonscious intention (cf., Paris, Lipson, & Wixson, 1983). 
We believe, as do other strategy researchers (e.g., Zembar & Naus, 1985a), 
that rigid adherence to eonscious intentionality as an attribute of strategie 
behavior would resuit in many behaviors long considered strategie to be 
classified as non strategie (e. g., the automatie sophisticated .processing of 
a text by good readers). Strategies are, however, almost always potentially r
conscious (e.g., skilled readers ean stop and think about their strategie re-
readings) and potentially controllable (e.g., good readers can re-read parts . 
of text that they faH to comprehend, if they choose do to so). See Searle 
(1980) for a thorough analysis of intentionality as an attribute that is often 
unconseious and not the principal motivation for aetions that accomplish 
goals. We emphasize that tbis conception of a strategy is eonservative. It 
is very similar to Miller, Galanter, and Pribram's (1960) cognitive plans, 
whieh are often executed unconsciously. Belmont (1984) provides inter-
esting commentary on the similarity of eognitive strategies to eognitive 
plans. 
As their name implies, most goal-specific strategies are do~ilt~pecific.  
For instanee, memorization strategies include rehearsal of to-be-leamed 
materials (e.g., Flavell, 1970), grouping organizable materials into clusters 
that "go together" beeause of semantie interrelationships (e.g., Moely, 
1977), and making to-be-associated materials more learnable by ereating 
relations (e.g., elaborations) between the separate elements that are to be 
linked (Pressley, 1982; Rohwer, 1973). Reading comprehension strategies 
include note taking, summarizing, underlining, and answering adjunet 
questions. There are also a number of goal-specific strategies for generating 
solutions to problems (Gagne, 1985, Chapter 6; Polya, 1973, 1981). For 
instance, when one knows little about a domain, reasoning by analogy from 
areas that one does know about is often helpful (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 
1980, 1983; Polya, 1954a, 1954b). Another form of expansion is brain-
storming (Osborn, 1963), which involves generating as many solutions as 
one can think of, with criticism of the potential solutions suspended until 
after a large number of candidate soIutions are generated. The best ones 
are then seleeted for further eonsideration. 
In short, tbere are many different goal-specifie strategies that GSUs ean  
apply to a variety of content areas ranging from school-like cognitive tasks 
such as mathematieal problem solving, (e.g., Carpe?ter, MO,ser, & ~?~­
berg, 1982; Ginsburg & Allardice, 1984) to mastermg physlcal achvltles 
such as complex motor skills and sequences (e.g., Burton, Brown., & 
Fischer, 1984). Pressley and Levin (1983a, 1983b) and Pressley, Helsei, 
McCormick, and Nakamura (1982), have provided extensive reviews of 
the many goal-specific strategies. 
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Monitoring Strategies 
Monitoring has been studied most extensively in a paradigm developed 
by Markman (1977, 1979). In the Markman studies, children heard prose 
passages that included inconsistencies, but often failed to note them; an 
outcome interpreted as a failure to monitor comprehension of the passage. 
In followup experiments, children were presented passages containing non-
sense words, anomalous sentences, internallogical contradictions, and con-
tent that clashed with world knowledge (Baker, 1985b; Wagoner, 1983). 
In general, children often fail to notice these types of problems in text, 
but it should be emphasized that adults do not monitor their comprehension 
completely either (e.g., Baker, 1979; Baker & Anderson, 1982; Epstein, 
Glenberg, & Bradley, 1984; Glenberg, Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982; TikM 
homerov & Klochko, 1981). 
Monitoring has also been studied in other paradigms, although not as 
extensively. For instance, Shaughnessy (1981) came to the counterintuitive 
conclusion that mature leamers do not monitor differences in learning 
produced by different strategies that they are executing while studying. 
Intrigued by Shaughnessy's conclusion, Pressley, Levin, Ghatala and tqeir 
associates (see Pressley, Forrest-Pressley, Elliott-Faust, & Miller, 1985, 
for a review) carried out a number of experiments in which learners used 
strategies that differed in potency. These investigators produced data sub-
stantiating that neither children nor adults accurately monitor differential 
strategy effectiveness while executing strategies (Pressley, Levin, & Gha-
tala, 1984). In addition, there is a growing body of data suggesting that 
learners are not good at monitoring the prob ability that they will remember 
text that was recently studied (Glenberg & Epstein, 1985; Maki & Berry, 
1984; Pressley, Snyder, Levin, Murray, & Ghatala, in press). 
Repeated demonstrations of monitoring inefficiency have resulted in a 
number of studies aimed at improving monitoring skills, most conducted 
within the error detection paradigm. There are now many demonstrations 
that children's monitoring can be improved with brief instruction. One 
especia1ly inexpensive approach, in terms of instructional resources, is 
simply to make clear to subjects what constitutes a sensible passage versus 
an inconsistent passage. Markman and Gorin (1981) were the first to dem-
onstrate that providing an appropriate standard of evaluation increases 
children's comprehension monitoring skills. Baker (1984a, 1984b, 1985a) 
extended Markman's and Gorin's finding, demonstrating that detection of 
lexical problems in text (Le., use of non sense words), detection of internal 
inconsistencies, and detection of external inconsistencies (i.e., violations 
of world knowledge) can be increased by instructing subjects to look for 
these problems and briefly explaining the nature of these difficulties. 
Other training approaches work as weIl. Capelli (1985) reasoned that 
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many monitoring errors were due to incomplete text processing. That is, 
children typically fai! to use inferential, constructive processing commonly 
employed by adults. Third- and sixth-grade children were trained to gen-
erate and evaluate hypotheses as they read through texts. Trained children 
detected more inconsistencies than untrained children. Elliott-Faust and 
Pressley (1986) taught children to compare the meaning of each sentence 
as it was processed to the meaning of the immediately preceding sentence 
and to the meaning of the passage as a whole. Comparison training in-
creased third graders' error detection skill. In short, there is considerable 
evidence that monitoring can be trained in error detection tasks. 
Because monitoring plays an important role in good strategy use, is 
generally underdeveloped, and can be improved through simple instruc-
tions, it should be an important target for additional research. There are 
many potential instructional tactics. Children can be explicitIy instructed 
to keep track of their ongoing performance and check their progress toward 
cognitive goals (e.g., Leal, Crays, & Moely, 1985). They can also be taught 
explicit counting strategies or external recording techniques to supplement 
internal monitoring processes (PressIey, Levin, Ghatala, & Ahmad, in 
press). 
Despite our rather negative protrayal of children's spontaneous moni-
toring, there are occasions when even very young children detect that their 
cognitions are a bit off. This type of monitoring leads to strategy initiation 
and modification--children monitor some errors in speech, some problems 
of listening comprehension, and some errors while doing calculations (e.g., 
Evans, 1985; Revelle, Wellman, & Karabenick, 1985; Speer, 1984; Wilk-
inson, 1982). One important hypothesis is that children monitor effectively 
given very familiar tasks and familiar settings (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1977; 
Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985). Understanding when young children mon-
itor and appropriately shift strategies and when monitoring breaks down 
should be a high priority for future research. 
There are two important outcomes that follow from monitoring. (1) Use  
of a particular strategy can be continued, terminated, or modified in light 
of the consequences produced by the strategy. This on-line decision making 
is the most frequently discussed role of monitoring (e.g., Davis, 1983; 
Krashen, 1978; Levelt, 1983). (2) Strategy knowledge can be enhanced. 
This second product of monitoring has potential for permanent effects on 
learning ability. When children actively monitor strategy implement at ion 
and performance, they can increase understanding of how to use the strat-
egy and the benefits gained from it. In this sense, monitoring procedures  
are metacognitive acquisition procedures (Pressley, Borkowski, & O'Sul-  
livan, 1984, 1985). Metacognitive acquisition procedures take other cog-
nitive procedures (in this case, strategies) as their input and yield additional,  
information about important strategy attributes. This information can be 
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coded permanently as either general or specific strategy knowledge, both 
major components of monitoring that are covered later in the chapter. 
High~order Strategies 
GSUs rarely execute goal-specific or monitoring strategies in isolation. 
Instead they carry out a sequence of strategies. Planful sequencing is a 
strategy itself:-a higher-order or metastrategy, in Chi's (1981) terminology. 
Planned sequences of strategies include both goal-specific and monitoring 
strategies. Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, and Campione (1983) refer to 
planned sequences of cognitive strategies and monitoring as self-controlled 
strategy use. Some of the best known self-controlled strategic sequences 
follow from Meichenbaum's (1977) theoretical position. Two examples 
derived from Meichenbaum's analyses illustrate the interweaving of higher~ 
order planning, goal-specific strategies, and monitoring. 
Bommarito and Meichenbaum (1978) designed an intervention to en-
hance children's reading comprehension. Seventh and eighth grade poor 
readers were instructed to use aseries of cognitive strategies in a particular 
order with monitoring components intertwined. They were taught to re-
mind themselves at the outset of reading to (1) discover the main idea .of 
the story, (2) to learn important details of the story, (3) to learn the 
sequence of events, and (4) discover how the characters feel and why. As 
reading proceeded, subjects were taught to pause and think about what 
they were doing. They were also taught to monitor whether they were in 
fact discovering the main ideas, details, sequences, and feelings of the 
characters. They instructed themselves to keep trying, and to keep cool, 
calm, and relaxed. The self-controlled strategie sequenee proved successful 
relative to a placebo control treatment. 
A second example of integrated self-control training was provided by 
Harris (in press). The subjects were normal and learning disabled seven 
and eigbt year olds. The task given to the children was to assemble a 
difficult puzzle, made more difficult by rigging a major piece so that it 
would not fit. A main goal of the study was to increase tbe children '8 
persistence and strategy use while working on the puzzle. Harris (in press) 
embedded specific strategies in a sequential cognitive plan. The plan spee-
ified that the subject should identify the problem early and should execute 
s~rat~gies su~h as tur~ing tbe colored pie ces of the puzzle up before be~ 
gmnmg, turntng the pleces to the correct orientation (Le., body parts and 
letters in the puzzle go right side up), and matching the puzzle parts off 
the board before placing them on tbe board. Subjects were also taught to 
evaluate their performances as they went along and self-reinforce them-
selves when they were making progress (Le., they were taugbt to monitor). 
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The main result of interest here was that persistence at the task generally 
increased following training to use the integrated sequence. 
What are the essential attributes of a good sequence of strategies and 
how does one go about constructing it? Most importantly, it must accom-
plish the intended cognitive purposes. To design sequences that do so, 
thorough task analyses are essential (e.g., ButterfieId, SHadi, & Belmont, 
1980; Gagne & Briggs, 1979). Task analysis identifies the processes that 
are sufficient and necessary to accomplish the task or solve the problem. 
The higher-order strategies integrate these sufficient and necessary proc-
esses so that they are carried out in an efficient fashion, consuming as few 
intellectual resources as possible. Efficiency is important given the limited 
processing capacity of working memory (e.g., Kahneman, 1973). A com-
mon way to engineer a complex strategy so as to make it compatible with 
Hmited capacity is to sequence operations so that only a small part of the 
cognitive plan occupies working memory at any given time. These attributes 
of a good high er-order sequence can be illustrated by recent work on 
referential communications. 
A typical referential communications task requires a child to confront 
an array of similar items-nonsense figures, colored geometrie shapes, or 
words. The goal is to provide word clues so that another person ean decide 
whieh of the objects is the referent. Careful task analyses of such clue 
generation have been condueted (e.g., Higgins, Fondacaro, & McCann, 
1981; Rosenberg & Cohen, 1966), suggesting three essential processes that 
need to be executed sequentially: (1) Communicators should generate an 
associate to the referent. (2) They should compare the eandidate clue to 
the referent and nonreferents to determine the extent of association to the 
two types of items. (3) Communicators should then evaluate whether a 
candidate clue has greater association with the referent than with any of 
the nonreferents . Without instruetion, children do not execute this se~ 
quence of behaviors. Typically, they generate an associate to the referent, 
but faH to compare and evaluate the clue. 
In a now classic study in the communications literature, Asher and Wig-
field (1981) studied the effects of training children to evaluate eIues. Word 
pairs were presented to third~ and fourth-grade ehildren (e.g., piano-vio-
!in). The task was to communicate to an imaginary listener which of the 
two words was the underlined referent. Children viewed a filmed model 
who produced clues with the evaluation component emphasized in mod~ 
eling. The child and model alternately produced eIues for a total of 20 
training pairs. The children were provided feedback as to the adequacy of 
their eIues. Over tbe course of practice trials, modeling was reduced to 
covert clue evaluation with children encouraged to do their evaluations 
silently. Trained chUdren provided better eIues on the post .. training com .. 
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munication task than control children exposed to the practice pairs, but 
given 00 training, although positive effects were restrieted to the pairs that 
adults found to be easy. This was a somewhat disappointing result com-
pared to the goal of generally improving referential communieations 
through strategy training. 
Elliott-Faust, Pressley, and Daleeki (1986) hypothesized that the prob-
lem with Asher's and Wigfield's training was that it emphasized only eval-
uation, leaving comparisoo to inferenee (despite Asher's and Wigfield's 
use of the term eomparison training to deseribe the instruction employed 
in their study). Elliott-Faust et al.'s (1986) experiment was aimed at de-
termining whether adding comparison training to instruction would lead 
to more generally positive effeets, as would be expected if the task analysis 
discussed earlier is eorreet. 
There were three training conditions in Elliott-Faust et al. (1986). Com-
parison emphasis subjects were told to compare potential elues to referents 
and nonreferents. Instruction in the evaluation emphasis condition was 
similar to Asher and Wigfield's (1981) instruetion. In the complete instruc-
tion condition, subjeets were taught to use both the comparison and eval-
uation strategies after a candidate elue was generated. The experiment also 
included two control conditions, inc1uding one very similar to the eontrol 
condition used by Asher and Wigfield (1981). 
Although all three training conditions produced improved clue genera-
tion for easy items, only the complete instructions resulted in significantly 
better clue production for items with less obvious elues. In summary, un-
ambiguous effects occurred only when children were instructed to earry 
out the sequence of processes specified by the task analyses. 
It should be apparent from the discussion of higher-order processes that 
higher-order planning and sequencing strategies do not occur in isolation. 
They always integrate lower-Ievel processes. It is not surprising that a 
number of recent reviews of the seIf-controlliterature have eoncluded that 
higher-order sequencing components are critical to effective execution of 
complex sequences (Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & Campione, 1983; 
Cohen & Meyers, 1984; Deshier, Warner, Schumaker, & Alley, 1983; 
Meichenbaum, 1977; Meichenbaum & Asarnow, 1979). 
SPECIFIC STRATEGY KNOWLEDGE 
How, When, and Where to Use Strategies 
Human beings have complex networks of knowledge about how, when, 
and where to carry out multiple actions (e.g., Cantor, MischeI, & Schwartz, 
1982). Such is the case with strategie actions. Without specific strategy 
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knowledge, a critical part of metamemory , a person could not recognize 
when to applya strategy (Pressley, Borkowski, & O'SulIivan, 1984, 1985). 
Specific strategy knowledge can be acquired from encounters with a 
variety of strategies, an assumption supported by experiments demonstrat~ 
ing that people abstract knowledge ab out strategies as they use them (e.g., 
Lewis & Anderson, 1985; Pressley, Levin, & Ghatala, 1984), and by de~ 
velopment of artificial intelligence programs that detect rules which are 
helpful for solving particular problems (see Langley, 1985, for arecent 
example and a review). Abstracting information from strategyencounters, 
however, does not always occur automatically. Sometimes learners need 
to be taught how to monitor their use of strategies, as weil as learn how 
to encode specific strategy knowledge that is abstracted from the situation 
(Lodico, Ghatala, Levin, Pressley, & Bell, 1983). The alternative to learn· 
ers detecting specific strategy knowledge is for external agents to provide 
it (Beimont, Butterfieid, & Ferretti, 1982). For instance, a strategy is better 
maintained following training if the strategy instructions include explicit 
statements that the use of the strategy affects performance in an important 
way (e.g., Black & Rollins, 1982; Borkowski, Levers, & Gruenenfelder, 
1976; Cavanaugh & Borkowski, 1979; Kennedy & Miller, 1976; Lawson 
& Fuelop, 1980; Ringel & Springer, 1980). See Pressley, Borkowski, and 
O'Sullivan (1984, 1985) for detailed commentary on how to increase specific .
strategy knowledge. 
The effects produced by specific strategy knowledge have been estab~ 
lished most clearly in the context of true experiments. For instance, O'Sul-
livan and Pressley (1984) conducted a within-experiment analysis of the 
effects of adding specific strategy knowledge over and above the infor-
mation that use of a particular trained strategy improved learning. It was 
hypothesized that adding information about how and when to use a strategy 
would increase transfer of the keyword method. Children in grades 5 and 
6 were presented two memory tasks during the study, first Iearning city-
product pairs and then the meanings of Latin vocabulary, Control subjects 
learned both sets of materials without strategy instructions, Subjects in 
four other conditions were taught to use the keyword method ,,:i!h th: city-
product pairs, with keyword instruction varying between condltlODs m the 
amount of "when" and "where" specific strategy information that was 
included. In general, more detailed information about the keyword strategy 
during city-product learning increased transfer of the ~eyword me~hod to 
l~arning of Latin vocabulary, which were presented wlth only t~e lD~tru~­
t10n to learn the meanings of the vocabulary items,. Although ~ Sulbva~ s 
and Pressley's (1984) results permitted the concluslOn t~at addmg speclfic 
strategy knowledge increases generaJized use of a. tramed strategy (see 
Heisel & Ritter, 1981, for data corroborating this pomt), much more work 
is needed to determine which 1::~::,:o~,~pecifiC strategy knowledge are 
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particularly critical to transfer and to document exactly how information 
about a newly acquired strategy is represented in memory. 
Motivational and Strategy-Attributional Strategy Knowledge 
One aspect of specific strategy knowledge that is partic~larly criti~al for 
effective strategy use is that learners must know when thetr succeS5 15 due 
to appropriate strategy use. They must also understand that some fail~res 
could have been avoided if they had used more appropriate strategles. 
These types of attributions about the specific causes of s~ccess and faHure 
are coded into Specific Strategy Knowledge. For instance, author MP has 
observed many adult learners in his laboratory who know that their good 
performance on associative tasks following keyword method instruction is 
due to use of the keyword elaborative technique. 
When people succeed or faH, there are many possible ways to explain 
the outcome. External explanations include attributing outcomes to luck, 
ease or difficulty of the task, and availability of external-resources (e. g. , 
teacher's assistance). Alternatively, people can blame or credit themselves, 
adhering to the·beliefthat they are dumb or smart (either in most situations 
or selected situations), or success can be viewed as the product of effort, 
failure as the lack of effort. Discussions of effort, ability, luck, and task 
 characteristic attributions abound (e.g., Weiner, 1985),·with the general 
recognition that only effort is personally controllable. The attributions of 
GSUs are probably a mix of all four types, but with disproportionately 
more attributions that success follows from effort expended in application 
of task-appropriate strategies (Clifford, 1984; Cullen, 1985). 
Attributing failures to insufficient effort, as GSUs do, is definitely psy-
chologically healthier than attributing failure to poor ability or to factors 
over wh ich the child has no contro!. When shortcomings are credited to 
low effort, the learner is likely to try new approaches to a problem or at 
least try harder (Diener & Dweck, 1978, 1980; Dweck & Bush, 1976; 
Dweck & Repucci, 1973; Licht, Kistner, Ozkaragoz, Shapiro, & Clausen, 
1985; Weiner, 1985). In contrast, poor learners, particularly learning dis-
abled students, often attribute their failures to lack of ability or to other 
extern al factors, and thus, are more likely than normal children to stop 
trying (e.g., Butkowsky & Willows, 1980; Pearl, 1982). For this reason, 
considerable attention has been paid to modifying the attributions of dis-
advantaged learners. 
For instance, Fowler and Peterson (1981) taught learning disabled read-
ers to interpret failures as occasions when they needed to try harder. 
Consistent with the position that attributions playa causal role in behavior 
change, readers who learned to use "try harder" attributions were more 
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persistent on subsequent reading tasks than learning disabled readers who 
were not provided such training. 
Reid and Borkowski (1985) worked directly on attributions about tbe 
importance of strategies. Hyperactive, underachieving second, third, and 
fourth graders were provided strategy instructional training using one of 
three teaching variations. Strategy control subjects were taught to use 
clustering-rehearsal strategies for list learning and to use an interrogative-
elaborative strategy to learn associative materials. Self-control children 
were also taught higher-order sequencing and monitoring techniques to 
use in employing tbe rehearsal and elaborative strategies. The specific 
higher-order sequence was based on procedures developed by Kendall and 
his associates (e.g., Kendall & Braswell, 1982), a program similar to Bom-
marito and Meichenbaum's (1978) higher-order plan described earHer. The 
self-control plus attribution subjects received the same specific strategy 
instruction combined with higher-order strategies that occurred in the self-
control group, except that they were also trained to attribute their per-
formance success to strategy use and failures to lack of strategy use. This 
training was integrated with strategy instruction by providing discussion 
ab out the reason for good and poor performance. 
The most important result in the Reid and Borkowski (1985) study was 
that the self-control plus attribution training produced more general and 
durable use of strategies than did either of the other two instructional 
variations. There was greater strategy maintenance in the self-control plus 
attribution condition both two weeks and ten months following training. 
In addition, subjects given the attribution training were more likely to 
apply the strategies to tasks not identical to the training tasks, but ones 
for which the strategies were appropriate. As expected, the attributionaI 
training affected children's beliefs about their behaviors, particularly their 
understanding that behavior is controllable. One of the more striking pieces 
of evidence-suggesting that newly acquired beliefs actually increased seIf-
control-was a decrease in impulsivity by children who were most hyper-
active at the outset of the study. 
Despite the fact that most research to date on the effects of attributions 
on performance has been with learning disabled children, there are obvious 
individual differences among normal children in their propensity to attrib-
ute mediated performances to strategy use. There are important variations 
in behavior associated with these attributional differences. Fabricius and 
Hagen (1984) provided a nice demonstration of this point. 
Children in the first and second grades of Fabricius' and Hagen's study 
were first given four trials of learning lists of categorizable items, two trials 
made under an incidental set and two under an intentional set. The lists 
were presented with items blocked by category, and subjects were induced 
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to process these lists by categories for these ?rst fo~r trial~. A fifth trial 
followed that involved leaming a noncategonzable 11st of Items. As was 
expected, leaming of the categorizable lists was easier t?an leam~ng the 
noncategorizable list. Subjeets were then probed for theu perceptlons of 
their learning performance and for their understanding of the basis of 
differential performance. They were asked, (a) "Was it harder, easier, or 
the same to remember the pictures this time?" (b) "Why?" (e) "How does 
[whatever the ehild identified in response to question b] work to make it 
harder (easier, the same)?" A second session was held a week later. An-
other adult presented the ehildren with an unbloeked list of eategorizable 
items. On this occasion, participants were instrueted that they could do 
anything they wanted to remember the list. 
About two-thirds of the ehildren in Fabricius and Hagen (1984) attrib-
uted improvements in learning the categorizable list to use of the sorting 
strategy. Subjeets who recognized that better performance was tied to 
strategy use were more likely to use the sorting strategy during session two 
than were ehildren who did not make the preliminary strategy attribution. 
Even so me seeond-grade ehildren make strategie attributions in some sit-
uations, attributions whieh later influence strategy use. 
Nonetheless, Ghatala, Levin, Pressley, and Goodwin (1986) demon-
strated that the ehain from strategically-mediated performance to attri-
butions about strategies to proficient strategy use on a subsequent oecasion 
is very fragile with young leamers. They also demonstrated that there are 
ways to inerease the likeIihood that appropriate strategie attributions can 
guide future strategy deployment. Although only some of the manipula-
tions in Ghatala et a1. 's (1986) experiment ean be covered here, a11 data 
eonverged on the same general concIusions. First, children were trained 
in one of four ways. In the 3-eomponent condition, subjects were taugbt 
to attend to and assess changes in performance when using different strat-
egies; to attribute changes in performance to the use of particular strategies; 
and to use the information gained from assessment and attribution to select 
the best strategy for a particular task. This 3-component treatment had 
been shown in a previous study to enhance selection of effective strategies 
in young children (Lodico, Ghatala, Levin, Pressley, & Bell, 1983). Two-
component subjects were taught only the first two components, assessment 
and attribution. One component subjects were only taught assessment. 
The fourth group of subjects were in a control condition which contained 
none of the three components. 
. Immediately following training, children learned three paired-associate 
hsts. One of the first two lists was studied using a moderately effective 
strategy, rehearsal of the paired items; and the other was studied using a 
ve~ ineffective method~ looking for matching letters in the pairs. Tbe 
chlldren then selected elther the rehearsal or letter-selection strategy to 
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learn the third paired-associate list. Metacognitive questions were posed 
at the time of choice to determine the children's rationale for strategy 
selection. 
Although children in all four conditions learned more items on the re-
hearsed list than on the letter-matched list, only children who had been 
trained to assess, attribute, and select based on assessments chose the 
rehearsaJ strategy at above chance levels. Eighty-nine percent of the 3-
component subjects selected rehearsal, versus 61 %,50%, and 44% in the 
two-, one-, and zero-component training conditions. In general, three-
component subjects were more likely than subjects in the other conditions 
to use memory-related and strategy-attribution reasons to defend their 
choice of rehearsal. Making assessments and attributions was not enough 
to guarantee selection of the more effective strategy in a strategy-selection 
situation slightly more complicated than the one studied by Fabricius and 
Hagen (1984) (Le., two strategies were trained in Ghatala et a1., 1986, 
versus only one in Fabricius & Hagen, 1984). Explicit instructions were 
required in order for children to use the assessments and the attributions 
based on those assessments in making strategy selections. See Pressley, 
Ross, Levin, and Ghatala (1984) for evidence that even among older chil-
dren (10- to 13-year-olds), efficient strategy selection does not follow au-
tomatically from assessment of and knowIedge about strategy potency 
differences. 
We think that the fragility of the assessment-attribution-selection chain 
with young children can be understood when considered in light of a large 
body of evidence on children's attributions about actions and reactions that 
they themselves are responsible for. Heckhausen (1982) identified four 
important components in recognizing that areaction was due to one's effort 
and the development of a corresponding attributional behalf. (1) Children 
must attend to the self-produced outcome. (2) They must attribute the 
outcome of an action to their own competence. (3) They must distinguish 
between degrees of task difficulty and personal competence, and be par-
ticularly aware that high personal competence is needed with difficult tasks. 
(4) They must differentiate competence from performance, distinguishing 
between the causa] concepts of ability and effort. 
Although even 5- and 6-year-olds have accomplished the first two com-
ponents, complete understanding of task ease/competence trade-offs is not 
completed until weIl into the second decade of life. Heckhausen (1982) 
has reviewed the relevant evidence on this point. If he is correct, it is 
perfectly sensible that younger children would not automatically identify 
strategie outcomes as due to their competence, or even more specifically, 
their effort ratber than their ability. Because the understanding of task 
difficulty/competence and ability/effort distinetions is partially developed, 
it is possible, however, to lead children down the garden path to strategy 
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attributions that affect behavior, as occurred in Ghatala et al. (1?86). 
However, more research is required to precisely correlate the dynamlcs of 
strategy choice with the various components in He~khause?'s (1982) mode~. 
See Stipek (1984) for additional commentary conslstent wlth Heckhause~ s 
analysis, and Nicholls (1978) for especially relevant research conducted lfl 
a North American context. 
In closing the discussion of attributional specific st~ate~y knowledge, w,e 
want to emphasize the distinction between effort att~butl~n~ an~ ~trateglc 
effort attributions. Both are important, but we bebeve lt IS cntlcal that 
children understand that hard work is not enough, that what is needed 
often is hard work deployed in a particular way-as a processing strategy 
matched to task demands. Such strategy attributions are especially impor-
tant when a GSU fails at a task: 
They allow one to escape the guilt ofnot trying [which would follow from purely effort 
attributions], and the embarrassment and shame associated with being stupid [which 
might follow from purely ability attributions]. But perhaps most importantly, strategy 
explanations tend to turn failure outcomes into problem-solving situations in which 
the search for a more effective strategy becomes the major foeus of attention. This 
search and exploration can be expected to elicit increased effort without the fear that 
subsequent fa Hure will automatically imply low ability (Clifford, 1984, p. 112). 
Consistent with Clifford's analysis of what it is adaptive for learners to 
believe, we hypothesize that GSUs have attached to many strategies a 
piece of knowledge of the following form: "1 do weIl in situation X because 
I exert effort and use strategy Y. If I do not work hard and use strategy 
Y when I encounter situations similar to X, I may not do weIl on those 
occasions." See Cullen (1985) for an extended discussion of evidence rel-
evant to this claim. 
Specific Strategy Knowledge is More than ConditionaI knowledge 
The fact that strategies are accompanied by specifie strategy knowledge 
permits them to function something like production systems in artificial 
intelligence (NeweIl & Simon, 1972). The strategies specify an aetion that 
is executed when particular conditions are met; conditions encoded as 
specific strategy knowledge. Indeed, in discussing so me of what we refer 
to as spe~fi~ stra.tegy knowledge,. Paris, Lipson, and Wixson (1983) use 
the artlficIalmtelhgence term condltional knowledge. We emphasize, how-
~~er, th~t specific strategy knowledge includes more than just conditional 
mformatlOn. As an example, consider the richness of what children know 
about the strategie value of retrieval cues (Beal, 1985; Fabricius & WeIl-
man, 1983). Good strategy users understand that retrieval eu es should be 
associated with targets, that the cues should have been encountered before, 
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but near in time to the desired retrieval, and that cues should be unam-
biguous (i.e., not equally relevant to non targets as to targets). Obviously, 
knowledge ab out retrieval cue strategies is not limited to information about 
when to execute these procedures. See PressIey, Borkowski, and O'Sullivan 
(1985) for explicit development of the case that specific strategy knowledge 
incIudes diverse information, such as how to modify the strategy internally 
(e.g., how to modify paired-associate elaboration so it can be used with 
4-tuples), whether the strategy is fun or easy to use, as weH as episodic 
information such as who taught the learner the strategy. 
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT STRATEGIES AND 
ASSOCIATED GENERAL STRATEGIES 
Although goal-specific, monitoring, and higher-order strategies have been 
the foeus of interest for most strategy researchers and are believed to be 
at the heart of good strategy use, there are other, more general tendencies 
that facilitate implementation of specific strategies. Bach of these tend-
encies is tied to partieular pieees of general knowledge about strategies 
that Iearners can possess. A review of three important aspects of general 
meta strategie know1edge iIlustrates how general factors operate in highly 
competent strategy execution. Some readers might wonder why more gen-
eral tendencies would be discussed after coverage of specific strategies. 
There are two reasons: (1) General tendencies ean only affect performance 
by making speeifie strategy implementation more likely. (2) Some of these 
general tendencies follow from extensive use of specifie strategies, and the 
f
general tendency can onIy be understood by eonsideration of its derivation 
rom specific strategy experiences. 
1. General knowledge about strategies includes understanding that per-
sonal effort often increases the likelihood 01 success. Knowing that one's 
fate ean be controlled has been referred to as self-effieacy C e.g., Bandura, 
1982), personal causation Ce.g., deCharms, 1968), and self-ageney Ce.g., 
Martin & Martin, 1982). All of these positions hold that this type of knowl-
edge is a powerfuI motivation aI force in human conduct and henee, an 
important determinant of behavior, a conclusion supported by an enormous 
volume of data (e.g., Bandura, 1983). For instance, learners who believe 
that performance is tied to effort in general are more Iikely to continue 
using strategies that they have been taught than are learners who do not 
recognize that effort and achievement often eovary (e.g., Borkowski & 
Krause, in press; Kurtz & Borkowski, 1984), that is, they have a general 
strategie tendency to deploy effort. 
2. The GSU also undel'stands that althollgh effort per se is important,. 
effort channeled into strategie activity is bettel' than wOl'king Izard. Thi~,
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realization follows (1) from experiencing occasions wben bard work ended 
in faUure because the effort did not include executing processes matched 
to tbe task, and (2) from otber occasions when strategic effort congruent 
with task requirements produced success. This is the "general" form of 
tbe specific strategy knowledge tbat use of strategy y is belpful in situations 
that have x characteristics . 
3. The GSU understantls that specijic strategies are not tied to one task, 
but ean be matched to new situations. 11 done properly, trained strategies 
can improve tunetioning in these new domains. I:Iow eioes the GSUgain 
this in~igbt? Tbe GSU can use a number of specific strategies and possesses 
knowledge about each strategy in varying degrees. Tbe GSU frequently 
and successfully applies specific strategies to "new" situations that possess 
the characteristics coded in specific strategy knowledge. Repeated success 
in using strategies when demands are not identical to training pro duces a 
general understanding that specific strategies can be used beyond training 
tasks. The result is a general tendency to stretch strategies to new realms. 
Thus, GSUs are likely to generalize strategies to near tasks even when 
tbey have been given scant opportunity to acquire much specific strategy 
knowledge about tbe particular strategy. Support for this position is in the 
form of positive correlations between knowledge about other strategies 
and the tendency to generalize newly acquired strategies. This correlation 
is obtained even with children (Borkowski & Peck, 1985; Borkowski, Peck, 
Reid, & Kurtz, 1983; Kurtz & Borkowski, 1985; Kurtz, Reid, Borkowski, 
& Cavanaugh, 1982). 
4. One ot the most important pieces ot general knowledge about strat-
egies that GSUs possess is that il strategie actions and plans are to be suc-
cessful, they should be shielded tram competing behaviors, distractions and 
emotions. This shielding is known as action control (Kuhl, 1984, 1985). 
Tbe GSU knows to attend to current processing and is intent on carrying 
out a strategie plan. GSUs do not get upset when they detect difficulties, 
but instead realize that emotions should be controlled and either more of 
the current strategie processing should be applied or new processing tried 
to resolve the difficulties. When monitoring indicates success, the GSU 
does not respond with uncontrolled elation, but instead moves to the next 
goal-specific strategy in tbe plan that accomplishes the next subgoal. The 
GSU also knows environmental conditions conducive to good strategy 
execution and uses this knowledge to control his or her environment. For 
instance, author MP knows that he cannot execute cognitive strategies 
when rock music is playing, and tbus he has engineered his study environ-
ment so that it is rock music free. Carrying out tbese action control strat-
egies sets the stage for, and facilitates execution of, more specific strategies. 
People armed witb many good specific strategies that accomplish specific 
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purposes, but who lack action control, are at risk for failing, simply because 
they are easily distracted from the task at hand. 
~udimentary action-contro] strategies are present even in very young 
cbtldren. For instance, children direct attention during a memory task as 
demonstrated recently by Baker-Ward, Ornstein, and Holden (1984). 
Those investigators presented 15 small, unrelated objects to 4-, 5-, and 6-
year-olds. Subjects were given one of three directions. Free play subjects 
were told simply to play with the 15 objects. Target-play subjects were 
told to play with the objects, but especially to play with five target objects. 
Target-remember subjects were told to go anything they could to remember 
the five target objects. The main result was that target-remember subjects 
attended much more to the five target items than did the children in the 
other two conditions. They labeled and visually examined the target items 
more. These activities did not significantly enbance recall of the target 
items for 4- or 5-year-olds, but did so for 6-year-olds. There was no evidence 
that the 4- and 5-year-olds were deliberately creating mediators. 
Our interpretation is that the children in Baker-Ward et a1. (1984) possess 
very primitive action-control strategies, but not the specific strategies re-
quired to actually mediate memory. Baker-Ward et al. (1984) offered dis-
cussion consistent with this conclusion, suggesting that the 6-year-olds were 
more likely to be constructing representations that could mediate recall. 
Yussen (1974) and Wellman, Ritter, and Flavell (1975) provide other ex-
amples of 3- to 5-year-old children attending to to-be-remembered infor-
mation and explicitly shutting out distraction. 
More striking still are reeent demonstrations that action control is present 
in even younger children. DeLoache, Cassidy, and Brown (1985) first in-
troduced 18- to 23-month~old children to a stuffed animal, a eharacter weIl 
known to the child (e.g., Big Bird). The child was told that Big Bird was 
going to hide and the child should remember where he was hiding, so she 
could find hirn when a bell rang four minutes Iater. Big Bird was then 
hidden under or behind an object in the room (e.g., under achair, behind 
a pillow). During the delay period the child was brought to the center of 
the room and encouraged to play with attraetive toys and erayons. 
The child could get up and approach the hiding Iocation if she wanted 
to do so, hut was prevented from uncovering the toy or hovering over the 
h~ding place for an extended period of time. The main findings were that 
children were active during the delay interval, striving to maintain attention 
to the hiding place. They verbalized about the hiding, looked at the hiding 
place, pointed to it, peeked, and tried to retrieve the toy .. But were the~e 
behaviors strategie in any sense? If they were, the behavlors should dls-
appear if memory demands were removed from t~e task. DeLoaehe et a1. 
(1985) conducted two additional variations of the btde-and-seek procedure, 
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neither of whieh required the ehild to remember where the objeet was. In 
one, the objeet was placed in the environment with delayed retrieval by 
the ehild required. This time, however, the object was placed .in view. The 
second variation involved placing the object out of view, but instead of 
the child being responsible for retrieval, the experimenter retrieved the 
toy when the bell rang. Both of these variations produced less attention 
to the hidden object than occurred when the child had to remember Big 
Bird's Ioeation. Even children younger than two years of age mobilized 
their attention in the service of an intention to remember. This is exactly 
what action eontrol is about; using general strategies like selective attention 
to insulate cognitive intentions. Selective attention shuts out potential in-
terferences. See Day (1980) and Pressley, Levin, Pigott, LeComte, and 
Hope (1983) for two other demonstrations that preschoolers deploy atten-
tion to eliminate the effects of powerful distractors. 
Preschoolers' knowledge about general action-control strategies is far 
from compiete, however, with many important developments in early ehild-
hood. For instance, Mischel and Mischel (1983) mapped out the devel-
opment of children's understanding that attention should'be directed away 
from tempting stimuli when trying to delay gratification. In general, all of 
the data colleeted by Mischel and Mischel (1983) were consistent with the 
conc1usion that although some preschoolers have good knowledge of var-
iables that reduce distraction and arousal (and hence, temptation), there 
is rapid development of this knowledge during the early grade-school years. 
Patricia Miller and her associates have conducted an especially important 
series of studies complementary to Mischel and Mischel's (1983) conelu-
sions, detailing children's knowledge about attention and distraction. Miller 
and Zalenski (1982) established that even three- and four-year-old children 
understand (1) that task performance can be disrupted by distracting noise 
in the environment, and (2) that people generally do better if they are 
interested in a task than if they are not. Particularly relevant to this dis-
cussion of general action-control strategies, preschoolers realized that dis-
traction was not nearly so potent a debilitating force when interest in a 
task is high ratber tban low. See Guttentag (1985) for another good example 
of preschoolers shielding attention from irrelevant input. Much additional 
data consistent with conclusions offered here have been generated in stud-
ies of preschoolers' leaming from television (e.g., Field & Anderson, 1985; 
Pezdek & Hartman, 1983). 
Knowledge about attention and distraction continues to improve be-
tween 5 and 20 years of age, with concomitant developmental improve-
ments in action control. See, for instance, Yussen and Bird's (1979) data 
on the growth of knowledge about attention from preschool to the early 
grade-schaol years. Children come to und erstand that debilitation due to 
noise varies with intensity of the distraeting stimulus and that attention to 
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task-irrelevant objects can disrupt learning (Miller & Weiss, 1982). Par-
ticularly interesting behavioral developments are (1) that children late in 
the grade-school years seem to focus attention intensely in the face of 
d~straction, and thus, distraction can actually improve performance (Hig-
gms & Turnure, 1984), and (2) with increasing age, children's shifting of 
attention is more efficient (e.g., Lane & Pearson, 1983). 
It must be emphasized, however, that all problems of action control do 
not disappear in early childhood (e.g., Bray, Hersh, & Turner, 1985; Bray, 
Justice, & Zahn, 1983) or with development. Kuhl (1984, 1985) contends 
that an important source of individual differences in adult cognitive func-
tioning is whether people have good action control strategies that set the 
stage for, protect, and serve other strategies. For instance, there are great 
individual differences in test anxiety. There is abundant evidence that 
during testing, test "anxious students worry that they are falling behind, 
scold themselves for forgetting the answers, and fearfully recall similar, 
previous test situations that ended in disaster (Covington, 1984, p. 39)." 
Such intrusive worry inhibits all other processing, including strategies that 
could be deployed to enhance test performance. See Morris, Davis, and 
Hutchings (1981), Sarason (1978), and Wine (1980) for detailed discussions 
of these cognitive intrusions. 
Individual differences in a~j9n control are apparent in childhood as well, 
certainly by 2-years of age (tee, Vaughn, & Kopp, 1983), and perhaps as 
earlyas the first year of life (e.g., Kopp & Vaughn, 1982). These individual 
differences in action control are linked with performance. Especially im-
portant are differences in children's selective attention to task relevant 
information, with selective attention deficits believed to be an important 
causal mechanism in hyperactivity and the behavioral problems associated 
with hyperactivity (e.g., Cullen, 1985; Rutter, Shaffer, & Sturge, 1975; 
Zentall & Shaw, 1980). See Ceci and Tishman (1984) for an especially 
analytic demonstration of poor selective attention and associated poor 
memory performance by hyperactive children. 
A good deal of research effort has been expended in overcoming prob-
lems of action control. Cu ring deficiencies of action control, however) is 
at best a necessary, not a sufficient condition to affect cognitive perform-
ance in general. For instance, although there are treatments that improve 
attention in hyperactive children, these interventions usually do not aff.ect 
learning, cognition, or academic achievement in general. This concluslon 
holds for drug treatments (Pelham, 1983), behavior therapy regimens (e.g., 
Ayllon, Layman, & Kandel, 1975; Christensen, 1975), but most relevant 
here, cognitive behavior therapies composed largely of attentional strategy 
instructions (e.g., Douglas, 1980; Pressley, 1979; Pressley, Reynolds, 
Stark, & Gettinger, 1983). See Keogh and Barkett (1980) and Whalen and 
Henker (1980) for excellent reviews. 
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In summary, general knowledge about strategies and general strategie 
tendencies facilitate the implementation of more specific strategies. Effort 
is required for most specific strategies. General knowledge of the relevant 
dimensions to consider for strategy use permits direction of a procedure 
even when learners have had little experience with the strategy. Action 
control protects these specific strategies from pejorative outside influences. 
For more fine-grained adjustments, however, specific strategy knowledge 
is required, and the relationship between new content to be mastered and 
current world knowledge must be assessed. We now turn to consideration 
of how that world knowledge affects operations on what we are about to 
learn. 
KNOWLEDGE BASE 
GSUs possess an extensive knowledge base, built up from years of ;xpe-
rience with the world. Although debates persist about the forms 0 rep-
resentations in this knowledge base, it is safe to claim that knowledgable 
people possess weIl integrated sets of information about episodes and corn-
monly-encountered sequences (Mandl er , 1983), such as going to a restau-
rant or a theatre or waiting for a bus. People also have a host of associations 
that are organized in decidedly nonrandom ways (e.g., Anderson, 1983). 
Some of these associations coalesce into hierarchieal, category-based struc-
tures (e.g., Mandler, 1983), and many exist as more or less isolated, some-
times functional, sometimes personal episodes (e.g., cotton swabs remind 
some people of babies because swabs are often used in association with 
caring for infants). 
In general, there are at least three ways that the knowledge base relates 
to strategy use. In describing these three mechanisms, we recognize that 
the distinctions between them are not entirely clear cut. Indeed, the phe-
nomena cited to support any one mechanisms can often be reinterpreted 
as evidence for the operation of one of the other two mechanisms. None-
theles~, even if future research does not generate independent validation 
for these three meehanisms, their use here provides a concise way of ca-
tegorizing contemporary research on the interaction of the knowledge base 
and specific strategies. 
Knowledge Can Diminish the Need for Strategy Activation 
~any instanees of effieient learning occur without strategie assistance 
(Chi, 1981). The most substantial research effort establishing this point 
has been condueted by Bjorklund (e.g., 1985), who makes the ca se that 
gr~de-school ehildren learn categorizable lists without conscious effort and 
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strategy use. Items within categories are often associated with one another 
(e.g., cat and dog, spoon and fork). Associations that are saHent in the 
young child's knowledge base are automatically activated when a catego-
rizable list is presented. They facilitate learning and retrieval of categoriz-
able lists even when learners make little or no strategic effort (e.g., Lange, 
1973; 1978). Although the young child also possesses knowledge of hier-
archical categorical relations (e.g., Perlmutter, Sophian, Mitchell, & Ca-
vanaugh, 1981; Ross, 1980), this type of information is not as accessible 
as associatively-based knowledge (e.g., Gitomer, Pellegrino, & Bisanz, 
1983; Ratner & Myers, 1981). Later in development, category knowledge 
becomes more extensive and is more easily accessible (e.g., Ford & Keat-
ing, 1981; Landis & Herrmann, 1980; Nakayama & Kee, 1980). Bjorklund 
(1985) contends that once the categoricaI knowledge base is extensively 
established, it is activated in the same automatic fashion that associative 
knowledge is triggered in the young child. 
Consistent with Bjorklund's (1985) view of accessible knowledge, Fran-
kel and Rollins (in press) factorially manipulated both category relatedness 
and inter-item associations. They found that fourth and tenth graders 
showed relatively high levels of organization in recall whenever category 
relatedness or associative strength between items was high. In contrast, 
kindergarten childrf:m displayed greater category clustering only for the . 
lists with strong inter-item associations. These results are consistent with 
the conclusion that only associative relations are readily and automatically 
available for younger children, whereas older children have ready access ' 
to both associative and hierarchical information. See Bjorklund and de 
Marchena (1984) for additional evidence of this shift in knowledge type 
availability, as weIl as Roth (1983), who provides data that accessibility is 
directly related to the degree of knowledge possessed by a learner. 
Rohwer , Rabinowitz, and Dronkers (1982), studying paired-associate 
learning, provided additional evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
knowledge-base activation often occurs automatically in children. Fifth-
grade children were presented one of two types of pairs to remember, 
either ones that are c10sely related in the knowledge base (e.g., ranch-
cowboy , fish-seaweed) or ones that were not so closely related (ranch-
floor, fish-napkin). They were presented the pairs with only the instruction 
to learn them, or they were instructed to generate a story to join the paired 
items (Le., construct a verbal elaboration; Pressley, 1982; Rohwer, 1973). 
The instruction to generate the story boosted learning of unrelated pairs, 
but did not boost learning of related materials. If the flfth graders had used 
elaboration strategically and spontaneously, then the story generation in-
struction should have had no impact at all. Thus, the boost in learning of 
unrelated pairs due to instruction is consistent with outcomes in other 
studics of elaboration instruction. Fifth graders do not spontaneously use 
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elaboration to learn unrelated materials (e.g., Pressley & Levin, 1977a), 
but can be induced to do so (Pressley & Levin, 1977b). The strategy is 
apparently not necessary when the to-be-Ieamed materials are already 
integrated in the learners' knowledge base, as was true for the related 
pairs. On the other hand, Rohwer et al. 's (1982) arguments would be 
strengthened considerably by more direct assessment of strategy use and 
probes tapping subjects' intentional use of strategies versus automatie ac-
tivation of knowledge. See Waters (1982) for conclusions consistent with 
Rohwer et al. (1982) that were supported by more direct measures of 
process. 
Mapping occurrences of knowledge activation versus strategie activity 
will be a prominent research activity in the next few years, with such work 
critical to the understanding of alternative routes to proficient performance 
and population differences in information processing. For instance, when 
reiated materials are presented in a blocked fashion, performance differ-
ences between younger and older normals and younger and oIder learning 
disabled children are smaller than when related materials are separated, 
and hence, semantic overlap is not so obvious. In the latter case, older 
children and normal children fare better (Ceci, 1984). This pattern ofresults 
is due to two factors: (1) There is automatie activation of and processing 
by the knowledge base in the blocked situation; activation that occurs for 
both younger and oider, normal and disabied children. (2) The separated 
situation requires true strategic activity for use of the knowledge base to 
occur; aetivity that is more likely with oider and normal children. We expect 
that the seareh for knowledge base x strategy x population interaetions 
will uncover many other interesting relationships. 
Automatie Coding of Some Meaningful Materials Prompts More 
General Strategy Use 
As they automatically process highly related items in a categorieal fash w 
ion, some ehildren may realize that eategorization is a good learning techw 
nique. Hence, they initiate eategorization strategies even when materials 
 
are not highly related. Bjorklund, Ornstein, and their associates have eval-
uated this hypothesis, and suggested that automatie processing of highly 
associated materials can lead to strategie proeessing of nonassociated cat-
egBo~cakllmadteriadlS'J b (1985) h d 
Jor un an aco s . a third graders, fifth graders, seventh 
graders, and ninth graders Iearn a list of 20 categorizable items. Within 
eategories, some of the items were highly associated (e.g., lion .. tiger, dog-
~at). Ot~ers were ?ot ass~ciated with other category members (e,g" cow 
IS not hlghly assoclated wlth dog, cat, tiger, or Iion). The 20 items wcre 
presented either in a random order, in a bloeked fashion with interitem 
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associations minimized (e.g., dog, Hon, cow, tiger, cat), or in a blocked 
fashion, emphasizing interitem associations (e.g., dog, cat, COW, Hon, ti-
ger). When associative relations prompt categorical strategie processing, 
recall of highly associated items oceurs first, followed by nonassociated 
category members. This pattern was most prevalent among seventh and 
ninth graders, with grade differences in this pattern most striking in the 
blocked condition emphasizing associations. Third and fifth graders ap-
parently failed to use nonassociative categorical relations to mediate recall. 
Reaction time data and analyses of clustering provided additional support 
for this developmental interpretation. An adult sampIe was subsequently 
administered the same list of items. The adults tended to reeall eategorically 
without starting with an associated pair ~ B jorklund and J acobs (1985) con-
cluded that adults used categorization even without associative prompting 
to do so. 
Best and Ornstein (1984) also presented data consistent with the inter-
pretation that processing of associatively-related categorizable materials 
ean lead to more complete semantic processing of nonassociated eatego-
rizable materials. Third graders learned a list of items with obvious cate-
gorical interrelationships. After learning this list of highly related materials, 
the transfer of categorization to materials that did not contain obvious 
relationships was tested. Automatie categorization during processing of the 
first list induced use of categorization with materials that would ordinarily 
not be processed eategorically by third graders. 
Bjorklund and Jacobs (1985) and Best and Ornstein (1984) are initial 
tests of the intuitively. appealing notion that,,:~elf-initi!l!~Q" strategy use 
b1.~~!!~~~~_!~ .s9!!l~t~~~s .sti~~"~s._c!ti.v_e}). (Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Naus, 
in press; Omstein & Naus, 1985). This hypo thesis holds that there is a 
carry-over from processing of materials that "elicit" more sophisticated 
processing because of their compatibility with elements that are readily 
accessible in the knowledge base, to materials that are not so obviously 
consistent with prior knowledge. Such carry-over experiences presumably 
can have a long-term impact, and in fact, are believed to be critical in the 
development of strategy use (e.g., Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982). Ornstein 
and Bjorklund hypothesize that at some point, children will reflect on their 
carried-over Ustrategy" use, realize its significance, and eonsequently ab-
stract its structure for use on future occasions; a process similar to reflective 
abstraction (Bjorklund, 1985; Piaget, 1971). This potential account of the 
"invention" of some strategies by children deserves serious research 
attention. 
The necessity for emphasizing "potential" consciousness and control 
when defining strategies, as we did earlier in tbe chapter, is very apparent 
when considering Bjorklund and Jacobs (1985) and Best and Ornstein 
(1984). Even though strategie processing that is driven by the knowledge 
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base probably does not quaIify as conseiously intentional or planful, it 
aecomplishes cognitive purposes, can be reflected on, and probably could 
be controlled if the subject wanted to do so. Thus, we consider this type 
of processing strategic, following the logic that if it looks like a duck, 
waddies, and quacks, it's a duck! 
Knowledge Enables Use of Particular Strategies 
Knowledge provides grist for the strategy mill. For instance, when pre-
sented physics or mathematics problems, less-than-expert solvers often use 
a means-ends analysis (Larkin, 1979; Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon, 1979; 
Simon & Simon, 1978). The problem solver possesses knowledge of an end 
state and makes ~n initial approximation at a solution. The approximation 
and end state are compared with the difference between the two. Long-term 
memory is searched for an operation that would reduce the diserepaney be-
tween the approximation and the goal state. What is relevant here is that 
the means-end strategy can only be successful when the problem solver al-
ready knows some domain-specific knowledge. For the example, the person 
working the problem must know how the two end states differ in ways that 
are relevant to the problem, as weIl as legal operations that ean be exeeuted 
to reduce these differences. When the knowledge base is not developed weH 
enough to carry out means-ends analyses, problem solvers may revert to 
less powerful strategies that do not depend as heavily on a rich knowledge 
base, such as working forward (Gagne, 1985, Chapter 5). 
With children, however, the bulk of the research on knowledge posses-
sion as an enabling condition for strategy use has been carried out in the 
area of memory. Some examples concretize this point and the diversity of 
memory-task situations that have been used to uneover dependencies of 
strategy use on the knowledge base. 
Omstein and his associates have carried out a variety of experiments 
aimed at documenting that strategy application depends largely on the 
 state of the knowledge base. Corsale and Omstein (1980) presented third-
grade ehildren a list of 20 "unrelated" items, ones that did not fall into 
explicit taxonomie groupings, but that nonetheless could be put together 
in a number of ways to form meaningful groups. When told to "make 
groups of pietures so that you will be able to remember the pictures later ," 
their sorting was essentially random. This was despite the faet that the 
children could sort hierarchically when explieitly instructed to "put things 
together that go together." Prompted by this finding, Corsale (1978) pro-
vided the same instruction to Grade 3 children, but varied whether children 
were given a list of highly saHent categorizable examples to learn or a list 
composed of items with low categorical salieney. Third graders given the 
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very A~lient materials sorted ,in a very organized fashion; tbird graders 
provided the low saliency list sorted randomly, even though they could 
sort .the I?W saliency list when told to do so explicitly. Spontaneous strategy 
use m thIS study depended on the relationship of the studied materials to 
the knowledge base, with sophisticated strategy use occurring when ma-
terials activated (were consistent with) the knowledge base and production 
deficiencies occurring when materials did not link up with the knowledge 
base. 
Enabling effects occur even when subjects are under strong instructional 
control to produce strategies. Tarkin, Myers, and Omstein (in preparation) 
examined 8-year-olds' rehearsal of lists as a function of meaningfulness in 
the verbal learning sense (Le., more meaningfuI items elicit more associ-
ations than do less meaningful materials). Rehearsal characteristics differed 
clearly as a function of meaningfulness. The most dramatic result was that 
rehearsal set size was targer for meaningful materials (Le., items that chil-
dren "know" more about) than for less meaningful items. Again, the 
knowledge base seemed to enable more sophisticated strategy use. See 
Ornstein and Naus (1985), Omstein, Baker-Ward, and Naus (in press), 
and Zembar and Naus (1985a, 1985b) for summaries of other studies con-
ducted by the North Carolina group that are relevant to the position that 
high knowledge enables high strategy use. 
Rabinowitz (1984) provided additional data that nicely complemented 
Ornstein's findings. Second and fifth graders were presented one of two 
types of lists to leam for feee recall. The Iists were composed of 24 items 
from 6 categories, with category members either highly or moderately 
associated with the category. Subjects were given one of three learning 
instructions, either (1) no instruction, (2) repetition of individual items, or 
(3) grouping by categories to learn. The categorization instruction was 
made especially easy to execute because categorization subjects were given 
the list items blocked by category. Items were not blocked for repetition 
or no strategy subjects. In general, for both second and fifth graders, the 
categorization instruction produced a greater boost in performance relative 
to the repetition and no strategy conditions when the list contained highly 
associated items than when it was composed of moderately associated 
items. The potency of the categorization strategies varied with the learners' 
knowledge base-a more potent strategy when items were strongly linked 
to the category label in the knowledge base than when the item~category 
linkage is weaker. 
This knowJedge enabling relationship has been observed in other mem-
ory paradigms as wellt Chi (1981) taught children to use a retrieval heuristic 
for recalling a set of names. The children applied the strategy easily to a.n 
overlearned, very concrete, highly faroiliar content (i. e., the names of theu 
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classmates), but had difficulty applying the strategy to another set of names, 
a list of unfamiliar people whose names bad been learned as part of the 
experiment. 
Pressley and Levin (1977b) observed a similar relationship between the 
knowledge base and strategy execution. Young grade-school children could 
quickly and easily apply an interactive imagery strategy to word pairs for 
which obvious relationships existed in their knowledge base (e.g., needle-
baUoon). When such relationships were not so weIl known, Grade 2 chil-
dren applied the strategy much more slowly, although they could execute 
it given sufficient time. 
Perhaps the most important recent direction in research on knowledge 
x strategy interactions is the study of differential strategy instructional 
effects during reading as a function of prior knowledge. This important 
new direction is a direct outgrowth of the general position that prior knowl-
edge and prior schematized knowledge are important determinants of text 
comprehension and learning (e.g., Anderson, 1984; Mandler, 1983). Con-
sistent with this position, many reading instructional programs aimed at 
children include components that activate relevant prior knowledge (e.g., 
Hansen & Pearson, 1983; Palincsar & Brown, 1984; Tharp, 1982). None-
tbeless, empirical evaluations of schema activation strategies with children 
are only now appearing. 
One was offered by Hasselhorn and Körkel (1986). Two types of Grade 
6 children participated in the study; those who knew a lot about soccer 
(soccer experts) and those who knew relatively little (soccer novices). Dur-
ing the preinstructional phase, the children read a 350 word story about 
soccer twice. The story contained six inconsistencies. The main dependent 
variable of interest was the number of text efrors that children could iden-
tify when asked to do so. Consistent with the earlier claim that the knowl· 
edge base is often automatically activated when a person encounters 
material that they know about, and consistent with voluminous data gen-
erated by schema theorists and researchers (e.g., Graesser, 1981; Mandler, 
1983), the soccer experts detected more inconsistencies (about 30% of 
them) than did the soccer novices who spotted 15% of tbe problems in the 
text. . 
Half of the experts and half of the novices then received one form of 
reading instruction based largely on knowledge activation. They were told 
to activate their prior knowledge relevant to the text contents and to use 
this knowledge for text comprehension. The remaining subjects were taught 
to use multiple strategies to direct reading, a mixture of goal-specific, 
monitoring, and higher-order strategies. They were taught to try to get 
hints from the title about text content. They were instructed to stop after 
each paragraph and to check whether they understood everything or not. 
They underlined the most important sentences and were told to rethink 
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content and summarize it. In addition, a four-step self-questioning strategy 
was taught for application when inconsistencies were encountered. Subjects 
were taught to ask themselves: (1) What is the problem at hand? (2) Which 
are the possible solutions for the problem that I can gather? (3) Which 
one will be the best to solve the problem adequately, and why is it the 
best one? (4) Is the problem at hand-after applying the solving proce-
dure-now completely resolved? Finally, subjects were told to apply ap-
propriate strategies before, during, and after reading. 
Following training, subjects were once again presented the soccer pas-
sage with the task of identifying inconsistencies in the passage. The most 
relevant result was that knowledge activation training boosted the per-
formance of experts from 30% to 63 %, but had little impact on novices 
who spotted only 21 % of the errors following training. Having the relevant 
knowledge base is an enabling eondition for benefits due to the knowIedge 
activation strategy. The multiple-strategy package elevated the perform-
ance of novices to 33%, slightly higher than the pretesting level of experts. 
Experts trained in multiple-strategy use also improved slightly from 30% 
at pretesting to 40% at posttesting. Thus, the multiple-strategies training 
approach was a better instructional option when prior knowledge was low, 
although use of multiple strategies never elevated the novices to the levels 
of experts who were prodded to make full use of their understanding of 
soccer. See Naus and Ornstein (in preparation) for another example of 
high knowledge about soccer leading to sophisticated strategic behavior in 
the learning of soccer content (Zernbar & Naus, 1985a, describe this study 
in detail). 
Closing Comments on Knowledge Effects 
It is common to pit process analyses and knowledge-based conceptions 
of eompetent performance against one another (e.g., Glaser, 1984; Stern-
berg, 1985). Although such a diehotomy is defensible for some purposes 
(e.g., for organizing some of the research reviewed in this chapter), pos-
tulating strong boundaries between strategie proeess and knowledge does 
not make sense in light of what we know about high-level thinking skills. 
In fact, such distinctions seem arbitrary for several reasons: (1) Goal-
specifie strategies are exaetly wh at the name implies-procedures that are 
appropriate for only certain tasks and domains (e.g., Glaser, 1984). For 
instanee, there are few "general" memorization strategies that are appli-
eable aeross tasks. Instead, there are procedures applieable for associative 
learning, list learning, and prose learning. Within these categories, addi-
tional distinetions are made. For instanee, categorization strategies are 
appropriate for list learning, but only if the list eategories are eonsistent 
with categories in the learners knowledge base. How ean strategie oper-
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ations that are only appropriate for certain portions of the knowledge base 
be completely disentangled from that knowledge base? (2) Even if one 
clings to the clear separability of knowledge and strategies, it is apparent 
from the data reviewed here that good thinking is a mixture of weIl artic-
ulated strategies and knowledge, and not due predominantly to knowledge 
or strategies alone (e.g., Chi, 1985; Rabinowitz & Chi, 1986; Rabinowitz 
& Glaser, 1986). Although strategy and knowledge effects can be studied 
profitably in isolation (as has been the case until recently), complete ex-
planations of good thinking must interweave these factors. 
AUTOMATICITY AND GpOD STRATEGY USE 
The GSU possesses a complex network of strategies (both general and 
specific), knowledge about those strategies, and knowledge about the 
world. When confronted with a task that can be solved strategically (e.g., 
learning some history facts for a test), the general strategies of effort 
expenditure and paying attention are activated. Assuming the situation 
bears some resemblance to one encountered previously, specific strategy 
knowledge can be used to identify an appropriate goal-specific strategy, or 
more likely in the case of the types of complex tasks that humans encounter, 
aseries of goal-specific strategies. These strategies are each matched to 
particular subgoals that form a sequence for accomplishing the task. 
Higher-order planning strategies arrange the goal-specific strategies 
matched to the order of the subgoals, mixing in monitoring as part of the 
higher-order routine. Strategy execution would be facilitated if the learner 
had good prior knowledge of history . If that knowledge were very com-
plete, the learner might realize early on that use of the complicated strategy 
sequence was unnecessary. Alternatively, using an imagery-pegword strat-
egy to leam important dates in the U .S. history might be facilitated by 
understanding the significance of the dates. For instance, constructing an 
image to mediate memorization of 1945 as the date of F. D. Roosevelt's 
death is facilitated by knowing what Roosevelt looked like, that he was 
president for most of World War II, and that 1945 was the last year of the 
war. 
One possible re action to this model is, "How could the mind possibly 
do all that, given the time constraints often put on strategy use?" After 
all, human beings have limited attention that can be applied to such prob-
lems (Kahneman, 1973). 
The answer was briefly discussed earlier in the chapter, but can be ex-
panded now that all the components have been reviewed. The good strategy 
user has automated many of the components, and thus, these components 
require little attention (e.g., Hess & Radke, 1981; Ackerman & Schneider, 
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1985). It is generally recognized that most of human performance is a 
mixture of automatie and controlled components (e.g., Sternberg, 1981), 
and that controlled components demand much more attentional capacity 
than automatie on es (e.g., Shriffin & Walter Schneider, 1977; Walter 
Schneider & Shriffin, 1977; Walter Schneider, Dumais, Shriffin, 1984). 
AIthough virtually aIl aspects of good strategy use could be earried out in 
a controlled fashion, many aspects are probably automatized through fre-
quent praetiee. Regrettably, there has been far more attention to controlled 
deployment of strategies. This attention is largely due to the assumption 
that eonscious, eapacity-consuming intentionality is a necessary attribute 
of strategie behavior. As detailed earIier, we do not concur with this view, 
and note that study of automatie aspects of strategy use is growing in 
prominence (e.g., Pressley & Ahmad, 1986; Bjorklund & Jacobs, 1985; 
O'Sullivan & Pressley, 1984, adult data; Rohwer , Rabinowitz, & Dronkers, 
1982). We suspect that really good strategy users probably recognize, with 
little effort, which strategies should be used in given situations. They se-
quenee and monitor goal-specific strategies habitually with relevant prior 
knowledge aetivated almost effortlessly, often through associations witb 
the new material (Bjorklund, 1985). Although speculative at this point, 
this portrait of praeticed strategy use is consistent with how practiced be-
haviors are carried out in general (Schneider et al., 1984). 
Two possible determinants of who becomes a good strategy user and 
who does not are: (1) individual differences in attentional capacity, and 
(2) individual differences in the facility for using available attentional re-
sourees. Although there is considerable debate about determinants of func-
tional differences in working memory (e.g., Dempster, 1985), evidence is 
accumulating that good thinking is tied to working memory efficiency (e.g., 
Benton, Kraft, Glover, & Plake, 1984; Massoß & Miller, 1983). We expect 
research to map out relationships between working memory capacities and 
good strategy use in the near future, especially given the likelihood of 
reciprocaI causation here. Working memory differences probably Underli
strategy use to some extent, but good strategy use in turn increases fune-
tional working memory (Dempster, 1985). 
On the other hand, the machinery hypothesized here works in the ab-
sence of extensive automaticity , largely beeause the many components . 
required in good strategy use are not executed simultaneously. Rather, 
components are usually executed sequentially. Thus, a person ean con-
sciously decide to get set to be strategie and explicitly eliminate distractions. 
After studying the task and its attributes, the strategy user elects relevant 
strategies and perhaps then thinks through how to map them onto the 
sequenee of subgoals that the leamer faces. The learner might then seareh 
world knowledge and aetivate knowledge relevant to the task (Levin & 
Pressley, 1981). The learner may consciously keep track of how leaming 
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is going, using monitoring skills, as the sequence is executed, and make a 
point of updating specific strategy knowledge when something important 
about a strategy is discovered during tbe task. As learning proceeds, tbe 
conscious strategy user might even make a point of taking note of newly 
acquired knowledge that should be stored. 
One of tbe most tantalizing possibilities is that even cbildren do this 
sequencing by taking their own attention al !imitations into account. Gut-
tentag's (1984) research supports this perspective. Guttentag first deter-
mined that use of a cumulative rehearsal strategy for list leaming consumed 
attention al capacity in grade-school children. His subjects experienced 
more interference on a concurrent task (finger-tapping) when they cu-
mulatively rehearsed than when they did not. Guttentag also found a neg-
ative correlation between spontaneous rehearsal and finger-tapping 
interference: The less interference, tbe greater tbe size of the set of items 
the subject rehearsed spontaneously. Guttentag interpreted this finding to 
mean that the "mental effort requirement of a strategy may be one factor 
affecting children's strategy selection. There may be a tendency for children 
to avoid using strategies which require a very large expenditure of mental 
effort on their part (p. 104)." An extrapolation of this argument is that 
the spontaneous use of more complex strategies by older children is a by-
product of increasing functional working memory (e.g., Dempster, 1985). 
Notably, Guttentag's conclusions are consistent witb other observations of 
greater strategy use by children when information processing requirements 
are reduced, and bence, when strategy use requires less effort (Waters & 
Andreassen, 1983). Because of dependencies between strategy use and 
automaticity , there is certainly motivation for a thorough study of these 
variables in interaction, with experiments like that of Guttentag consti-
tuting (1984) a good beginning. 
THE CHALLENGE THAT THE GSU MODEL POSES 
FOR DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 
We have suggested that there is a developmental orderliness to strategy 
development, even if the details ab out the course of that development are 
not weIl worked out at this time. At one extreme are young children who 
possess onIy general action control tendencies and tbe beginnings of world 
knowledge. In contrast, mature learners are facHe at appropriate deploy-
ment of higher-order, goal-specific, and monitoring strategies. They possess 
general strategie tendencies that facilitate the use of other strategies. Ma-
ture learners also thoroughly understand a wide range of strategies, rec-
ognize which aspects of tbe world they are knowledgable about, and sense 
how their personal world knowledge interacts with their use of strategies. 
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Thus, development consists of aequiring and automatizing the strategie 
eomponents and learning to use them in concert with an ever-increasing 
and somewhat personal knowledge about the world. The challenge for 
developmental psyehologists is to map development of both the eompo-
nents per se as well as age-related ehanges in eomponent interaetions. 
Meeting this ehallenge will be eostly and time eonsuming, hut one important 
byproduet that justifies the costs will be new and more effeetive ways to 
train strategie thinking in actual c1assroom settings (Pressley, 1986; Pressley 
& Levin, 1983a, 1983b). 
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